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Cruise ship operators that are subject to Australian laws find that their passengers have 
important rights under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ("TPA"), particularly 
sections 52 and 74.  However recent changes to the law have reduced the scope of these 
claims and given some ground back to the cruise ship operators.  Additional proposed 
amendments, still before parliament, will alter the scenario again.  The overall result is 
a further muddying of the waters for passenger claims where Australian law applies. 
This paper considers the circumstances in which a cruise ship operator will be bound 
by the provisions of the TPA, explores the impact of the TPA on cruise ship passenger 
liability, reflects on the recent and proposed changes to the TPA as regards liability for 
personal injury and looks at the consequences for the cruise ship operator who wishes 
to invoke a Convention limiting passenger liability. 
Introduction 
Maritime law contracts are intensely commercial in nature.  A complex web of 
interlinking contracts, conventions and legal fictions underpin the relationships and 
liabilities of the various parties involved. It is a stated aim of the courts to interpret and 
enforce contracts and relevant international conventions1 in a manner that provides 
certainty in commercial circles.2  However, the Australian Trade Practices Act (TPA) 
can apply to maritime law contracts - and when it does, the TPA can cut through 
traditional contractual arrangements.  Particularly vulnerable to the TPA are contracts 
entered into by cruise ship operators with passengers for a cruise.    
This paper will focus on two sections of the TPA - section 52, which prohibits a 
corporation engaging in misleading or deceptive conduct and section 74 which imposes 
a statutory term in a contract for services supplied to a consumer, that those services 
                                                          
* Senior Lecturer in Law, Murdoch University.  This article had its genesis in a presentation given to the 
Maritime Law Association of Australia and New Zealand Annual Conference in October 2003 in Brisbane, 
Australia.  It reflects the author’s understanding of the law as at 20 November 2003 save that it has been 
updated to take into account the Senate’s rejection of the Trade Practices Act (Personal Injury and Death) Bill 
2003 in February 2004 together with the coming into force (in May 2004) of the 1996 Protocol to the 
Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 1976.
1Eg ‘It has been recognised that a national court, in the interests of uniformity, should construe rules 
formulated by an international convention, especially rules formulated for the purpose of governing 
international transactions such as carriage of goods by sea ‘in a normal manner, appropriate for the 
interpretation of an international convention, unconstrained by technical rules of English law or by English 
legal precedent, but on broad principles of general acceptation.’ Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Gamlen 
Chemical Co (A/Asia) Pty Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 142, 159 (Mason & Wilson JJ) 
2 See, eg Federal Commerce and Navigation Co Ltd v Tradax Export S.A. (The Maratha Envoy) [1978] AC 1, 
8 (Lord Diplock). 
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will be rendered with due care and skill. Section 74 operates in a more traditional 
fashion because it attaches to contracts rather than conduct.   
The vulnerability of passenger cruise ship contracts to the TPA arises because one of 
the aims of the TPA is to control the conduct of corporations towards consumers.3  The 
nature of cruising as a holiday taken by individuals means that all passengers aboard a 
cruise ship will be consumers under the TPA.  All of those passengers will have, at 
some earlier point, received representations about the type of experience they can 
expect.  All those passengers are captive in an environment created and maintained by 
the cruise ship operator for the passengers’ safe enjoyment and pleasure, for periods 
varying from a day or two, to weeks or even months.  If the representations prove to 
have been less than accurate, the passenger is injured or (for some other reason 
attributable to the operator) does not enjoy their cruise experience; the passenger may 
look to recover from the cruise ship operator.  Assuming the necessary jurisdictional 
nexus can be satisfied,4 it is likely that an injured5 or disgruntled passenger will have a 
remedy under the TPA.  Therefore, this Australian Act needs to be considered as part of 
the legislative landscape that can affect a cruise ship operator who conducts business or 
advertises for business in Australia. 
Of course, cruise ship operators, like all those in the maritime field, are used to the 
intrusion of local law on their business arrangements, at least to some degree.  Most 
operators, if not all, would manage that intrusion by seeking to control and limit their 
potential liability.  Usually an operator would rely on specific International Conventions 
limiting liability for the carriage of passengers (specifically, the Athens Convention 
Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea and its various 
amending protocols) 6 along with the judicious use of contractual terms and conditions.  
Many countries have adopted these Conventions.  However, Australia, like the United 
States of America, has not ratified the Athens Convention or any of its protocols. 
Therefore, for reasons the paper will explore, it is feasible in many instances for 
passengers in Australia to rely on their statutory rights under the TPA in an action 
against the cruise ship operators.  Significantly, the TPA has traditionally been hostile to 
attempts to exclude liability that would otherwise accrue as a result of a breach of its 
provisions.7
However, recent amendments and proposed amendments to the TPA have the 
potential to dramatically alter – and arguably, skew – the remedies available to a 
                                                          
3 Passengers are taken to have acquired particular services as a consumer if the price of the services did not 
exceed the prescribed amount – currently $40,000- or were of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal domestic 
or household use:  Section 4B (1) (b) TPA.  Passengers can also be consumers if the cost of the services was 
greater than $40,000 so long as the services were of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal domestic or 
household use or consumption.  One would expect a cruise ship holiday would so qualify, even in the less 
likely event that it was a business function, because a cruise ship is ‘ordinarily acquired for personal use’ as 
required by section 4B (1) (b).  Nor does the consumer need to be an Australian or based in Australia – see 
Wells v John R Lewis (Int) P/L (1975) 25 FLR 194, 208.
4 As described in the next section. 
5 Although the recent reforms and those proposed will make personal injury claims under the TPA less likely.  
See discussion accompanying fn 66 (s52) and 93 (s74) below. 
6 Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, 1974 (known as the 
Athens Convention).  There have been protocols to the Athens Convention made in 1976, 1990 and 2002.  
Thus far only the 1976 Protocol has come into force. See text accompanying fn 127 below. 
7 See below at text accompanying fns 44 and 78. 
32                                                                                                       Kate Lewins 
(2004) 18 MLAANZ Journal 
passenger under the TPA.8  The result of these amendments will be that cruise ship 
operators will need to navigate through a more complicated legal landscape to 
determine their potential liability to passengers under the TPA.  In order to do so, the 
jurisdictional reach of the TPA will need to be considered, as well as the type of damage 
and the manner in which it was sustained.   
With the increase in popularity of cruising, both in Australian waters and overseas,9
it is important for cruise ship operators and their advisers to be aware of obligations 
imposed upon them by the TPA.  This paper explores the likely application and effect of 
the TPA on contracts between cruise ship operators and their passengers.  First it 
outlines the nexus to Australia that is required before the Act can apply. It considers the 
two most likely sections that a disgruntled or injured passenger would be likely to use 
and outlines recent and proposed changes.   Finally, it looks at the implications of a TPA
action on the cruise ship operator’s right to limit liability under the Athens Convention 
and the Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims Act 1989 (Cth).   
In what circumstances will a cruise ship operator be caught by the provisions of 
the TPA?  
One would be forgiven for assuming that the impact of the TPA is limited to Australian 
territory and those corporations registered in Australia.  However the TPA seeks to 
impose its provisions on those doing business within Australia (even if they have no 
corporate presence in Australia) and also extends its reach to conduct outside Australia 
in certain circumstances. Significantly for cruise ship operators, the application of the 
Act cannot be thwarted by choice of law clauses.10  Nor will an arbitration clause be 
allowed to operate in a manner that excludes the application of the TPA, or deprive the 
parties of remedies that a court may grant under the Act.11
As we shall see, different considerations seem to apply in determining when s52 or 
s74 will apply to a given set of facts with an overseas element.   
Territorial and Extraterritorial application of s52. 
Territorial application: Where conduct takes place in (or is received in) Australia it 
will be caught by the TPA 
For a claim based on s52, the misleading or deceptive conduct relied upon must have 
either occurred within Australia or, if it originated overseas, the corporation in question 
                                                          
8 Amendments are part of the suite of reforms that have occurred or are occurring in the area of personal 
injury and negligence, for instance, those suggested by the Ipp report: see below at text accompanying fns 66 
(s52) and 94 (s74). 
9 Paper given by Richard Hein (Chairman, P&O Cruises) to MLAANZ National Conference held in Brisbane 
on 2 October 2003 where it was revealed that there had been an average 9% compound growth in cruising 
over the decade to 2002. The slides that accompanied Mr Hein’s paper are available on the MLAANZ website 
<http://www.mlaanz.org/2003%20Conference/Richard%20Hein.ppt> at 29 June 2004. 
10 Francis Travel Marketing Pty Limited v Virgin Atlantic Airways Limited (1996) 39 NSWLR 160 (NSW 
Supreme Court). See also s67, which is relevant to s74 and is discussed below at text accompanying fns 25 
and 26. 
11 Emmett J in Hi-Fert Pty Ltd & Anor v Kiukiang Maritime Carriers Inc & Anor (1998) 90 FCR 1 as cited by 
B McCabe in ‘Compulsory Arbitration Clauses and Claims under the Trade Practices Act’ (1999) 7 TPLJ 41 
at 43.   It is still possible for both parties to agree to arbitration of a dispute that arises under the TPA but 
parties cannot be held to that agreement if the effect is to thwart the TPA: see Emmett J, at 26.  See also M. 
Davies ‘A chink (or two) in the Bill of Lading Plaintiff’s Jurisdictional Armour? Good news for Australian 
Maritime Arbitration?’ (1998) 26 ABLR 70, 74. 
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must have expected it to be received in Australia.12 For instance, the development or 
circulation of brochures for overseas cruises sent to Australians from overseas would 
bring representations made within those brochures into the net of the TPA. Another 
example is where representations are made during contractual negotiations with an 
interested customer who is based in Australia.   To the extent they were received and 
intended to be received in Australia, these representations will be caught by the TPA 
and subject to s52. 
Extraterritorial application: Conduct by an Australian registered corporation or one 
carrying on business in Australia will be caught, regardless of where conduct took 
place. 
If the conduct in question occurred entirely overseas, section 5 provides that the TPA
will apply to that conduct only if it were by a company registered or carrying on 
business in Australia.13  This is the only means by which the TPA, and therefore s52, 
can extend to conduct that occurs overseas.14  The TPA will apply to the conduct, here 
or overseas, of an Australian cruise ship operator – that is, where the corporation (not 
necessarily the ship) is registered in Australia or is carrying on business in Australia.  It 
is easy to establish if a corporation is registered in Australia.  What is more difficult is 
to establish whether a corporation not registered in Australia is nevertheless ‘carrying 
on business’ in Australia.   The interpretation of the phrase ‘carrying on business’ has 
been a vexed issue in conflict of laws.  Recently, the Federal Court rejected a narrow 
interpretation of the phrase that would have limited it to situations where a foreign 
corporation had a place of business in Australia.15  In an earlier case, Justice Mason (as 
he then was) of the High Court said that  
‘business’ denotes activities undertaken as a commercial enterprise in the nature of a 
going concern; that is activities engaged in for the purpose of profit on a continuous and 
repetitive basis.
16
If the foreign corporation has an office or agents in Australia undertaking its 
business17 then it will quite likely be carrying on business here.  If it is, then both its 
conduct in Australia and its conduct outside Australia will be caught by the TPA
provisions.18
                                                          
12 Communications initiated outside Australia but directed to, and expected to be received by, persons in 
Australia was held to amount to conduct taking place in Australia by Merkel J in Bray v Hoffman La Roche 
Ltd (2002) 118 FCR 1, [147]. The same approach was adopted by Drummond J in a fair trading context in 
Howard & Ors v National Bank of New Zealand & Ors (2002) 121 FCR 366, [42].  
13 Note the requirement that written ministerial consent is required before a party is entitled to seek a remedy 
under s82 or s87: Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s5(3). 
14 The TPA relies primarily upon the corporations power for its constitutional validity, but does also rely, in 
the alternative, upon the trade and commerce power – see s6.  The High Court has recently had cause to 
consider the trade and commerce power: Re the Maritime Union of Australia & Ors; ex parte CSL Pacific 
Shipping Inc (2003) 200 ALR 39 in which the court said at [36] that ‘it is well settled that, in the exercise of 
the trade and commerce power, the Parliament can validly regulate the conduct of persons employed in those 
activities which form part of trade and commerce with other countries and among the States.  A ship 
journeying for reward is in commerce…’. 
15 See Bray v Hoffman La Roche (2002) 118 FCR 1, [63]. 
16 Hope v Bathurst City Council (1980) 144 CLR 1, 8–9.  Gibbs, Stephen and Aickin JJ concurred. 
17 This will require an analysis of the relationship between the principal and agent, and in particular whether 
the agent is in truth carrying out the principal’s business: see Commonwealth Bank of Australia v White 
[1999] 2 VR 681, 691; Bray v Hoffman La Roche (2002) 118 FCR 1, [63-64]. 
18 Subject to the need for a nexus with Australian trade and commerce. See text accompanying fn 19. 
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There also needs to be some connection with trade or commerce with or in Australia 
for the TPA to apply.19 For instance, representations made by an Australian company to 
overseas consumers while promoting its Australian cruises at an overseas travel fair will 
be caught by s52.20 The requirement for the representation to be made in the context of 
trade or commerce with Australia means s52 would probably not apply to a company 
carrying on business in Australia promoting only its overseas cruises at the same travel 
fair.21
Can the TPA apply where there is: 
Conduct whilst on the high seas – ‘yes madam, the gym exercise equipment is 
checked every day’.  
Or in a foreign port – ‘our onshore tours are conducted with your safety and pleasure 
in mind’. 
Most representations that would be caught by the TPA would happen before or at the 
time of contracting, or perhaps as the passenger settles themselves in the cabin whilst 
still in an Australian port.  But what about those representations which occur outside 
Australia – perhaps during the cruise, outside Australian waters or in the waters of 
another country?  If the representation is made on behalf of an Australian company or 
one carrying on business in Australia, then the TPA will apply by virtue of its 
extraterritorial provisions.22  The representation will be subject to s52.  However if the 
representation is made on behalf of a cruise ship operator who does not carry on 
business in Australia then the TPA will not apply once the ship is out of Australia or if 
the cruise is wholly outside Australia.  So, for example, the TPA will not apply to 
representations made to an Australian whilst on a Mediterranean cruise booked from 
Australia and operated by a company who is neither registered nor carrying on business 
in Australia.23
In summary, in each instance it is a case of establishing whether the TPA applies to a 
given fact scenario.  If the conduct occurred in Australia or was intentionally directed to 
Australia it does not matter if the cruise ship operator is not registered or carrying on 
business here.  The TPA will apply.  If the conduct was misleading or deceptive then the 
cruise ship operator will be liable.  The issuing of brochures in Australia, or even 
posting them to an interested customer in Australia, will render the representations in 
the brochure subject to s52.  This will be the case, even if Australia is not the port of 
embarkation.  The TPA will catch conduct occurring overseas, if the perpetrator is 
registered or carrying on business in Australia.  The exact interpretation of ‘carrying on 
business’ remains a hot topic for litigation. 
                                                          
19 Due to the constitutional limitations of the TPA.  That requirement would be satisfied by, for instance, an 
Australian cruise company or one trading here, who was operating cruises outside Australia.  It would not be 
satisfied if for instance, an Australian consumer in the UK booked an English Channel ferry crossing with a 
company neither registered nor carrying on business in Australia.  
20 Wells v John R Lewis (Int) P/L (1975) 25 FLR 194 established that the TPA was not solely concerned with 
Australian consumers. 
21 It is at least arguable that here there is an insufficient connection with trade or commerce in Australia. 
22 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s5. 
23 But if those representations had been made to the Australian whilst he or she was still in Australia – for 
example, in a confirming fax or letter, then the representations would be caught as conduct taking place in 
Australia.
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Extraterritorial application of s74 
What about the application of s74?  When does that implied warranty apply to 
transactions partly based, or performed, overseas?  Section 5 outlined above24 purports 
to grant extraterritorial jurisdiction over all of Part 5 of the TPA, including Division 2 
which contains s74.  However the language contained in s5, of corporations ‘engaging 
in conduct’, does not make much sense in the context of statutory warranties imposed in 
contracts.  Of greater assistance is s67 coupled with general conflict of law principles.  
Section 67 states that so long as the proper law of the contract is that of Australia25 then 
any attempt to substitute the law of another country for the consumer protection 
provisions of the TPA will be ineffective.26  The determining factor is therefore whether 
the law of the contract is Australian.  If it is, then s74 applies, regardless of whether it is 
breached overseas, because it is still a breach of the contract to which Australian law 
applies.  If an Australian enters a contract in Australia for a Mediterranean cruise with 
an overseas cruise ship operator, and if the facts were such that the proper law of the 
contract was Australian law,27 it is submitted that failure to exercise due diligence in the 
provision of the services on that Mediterranean cruise would result in TPA liability.28
Relevant provisions of the TPA – an outline 
The main provisions that are most likely to be used in a claim against a cruise ship 
operator are s52 and s74. For brevity’s sake this paper will mainly confine itself to these 
two sections, but other sections that are potentially relevant will be mentioned at the end 
of this section. 
Section 52 – prohibition against misleading or deceptive conduct 
Section 52 reads: 
(1) A corporation shall not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or 
deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive. 
(2) … 
Section 52 is a revolutionary provision that has cut across all other forms of relief 
for civil disputes in Australia.  It is:  
a comprehensive provision of wide impact, which does not adopt the language of any 
common law cause of action.  It does not purport to create a liability at all; rather it 
establishes a norm of conduct…. 29
                                                          
24 At text accompanying fn 13. 
25 Or some State or Territory of Australia.  
26 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s67. 
27 Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Company Inc. v. Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197 provides a useful fact 
scenario, although the case itself concerned a challenge to Australian jurisdiction and the place of contract, 
rather than a decision of the law applicable to the contract.  In that case the plaintiff arranged a Mediterranean 
cruise via a travel agent in Sydney.  The plaintiff was given an exchange voucher by the travel agent to 
exchange for the passage tickets in Greece just prior to boarding the ship.  The plaintiff was injured in a trap 
shooting activity on board.  The court found that the contract was entered in Australia rather than when the 
voucher was exchanged in Greece.  If such a scenario had occurred after 1986 (see fn s 84 and 85) and a court 
found that the proper law was that of Australia, then it would certainly be arguable that s74 would have 
applied to the cruise contract. 
28 There are complicated issues involved in determining the governing law of the contract, particularly as 
regards contracts made on the Internet.  Such matters are outside the bounds of this paper. For a discussion of 
the relevant principles, see texts on conflicts of laws such as Peter Nygh and Martin Davies Conflict of Laws 
in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2002, 7th edition), in particular chapter 19. 
29Brown v Jam Factory Pty Ltd (1981) 35 ALR 79, 86 (Fox J). 
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It has been referred to by some as the ‘new corporate morality’. Initially, the 
Australian courts’ interpretation of s52 was conservative.  But, over time, its reach has 
extended from the realm of consumer protection into that of commercial contracts; even 
a breach of contractual warranties may constitute misleading or deceptive conduct.30 It 
has virtually replaced the law relating to misrepresentation in Australia and in so doing 
has simplified it.  Although in this context we are largely interested in its effect on 
contracts, it is by no means limited to situations where the parties are in a contractual 
relationship.  In Australia, it has been applied to areas as diverse as advertising, 
newspaper articles, property transactions, sale of goods, the professions, takeover bids 
and, relevantly, holidays - to name but a few.31
Section 52 prohibits a corporation from ‘engaging in conduct’ that is misleading or 
deceptive or likely to mislead and deceive.32  The Act defines ‘engaging in conduct’ 
broadly, as: 
doing or refusing to do any act, including the making of or the giving effect to a provision 
of, a contract or arrangement, the arriving at, or the giving effect to a provision of, an 
understanding or the requiring of the giving of, or the giving of, a covenant.33
As for the words ‘mislead or deceive’, the courts have tended to avoid the mere 
substitution of alternate words, adhering closely to the dictionary definitions such as: 
deceive : …’to cause to believe what is false, to mislead as to a matter of fact, to lead into 
error, to impose upon, delude, take in 
mislead: to lead astray in action or in conduct, to lead into error, to cause to err.34
Section 52 can be breached unwittingly, without either intent35 or negligence, and 
may even be breached by silence where there is a duty to reveal relevant facts.36  The 
section can be breached if no person has actually been misled (although any person 
alleging a breach of s52 needs to show reliance on the conduct and damage resulting 
from that reliance in order to receive relief.37)  It can also be breached by statements that 
are literally true but, once assessed in the light of the overall effect and context, are 
found to contain a false representation.38
                                                          
30 Accounting Systems 2000 (Developments) Pty Ltd v CCH Australia Limited (1993) 42 FCR 470.  This 
decision has fuelled controversy amongst academics – see Skapinker & Carter ‘Breach of Contract and 
Misleading or Deceptive Conduct in Australia’ (1997) 113 Law Quarterly Review 294 and Cornwall-Jones 
‘Breach of Contract and Misleading Conduct: A storm in a teacup?’ [2000] Melbourne University Law Review 
10. 
31 See Russell V Miller, Miller’s Annotated Trade Practices Act (LBC, 2003, 24th edition) (‘Miller’) 
paragraphs 1.52.170 – 1.52.280 for examples of the various situations in which s52 has been held to apply. 
32 The threshold requirement for a corporation acting in trade or commerce will not be discussed here as in the 
context of a cruise ship operator offering its services, this will be easily satisfied.    
33 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s4(2). 
34 Weitmann v Katies (1977) 29 FLR 339, 343 (Franki J) quoting the Oxford Dictionary.  
35 Though intent is not necessary it can be relevant, because if there were intent then conduct would be 
deceptive rather than merely misleading. 
36 An example of this may be the failure to withdraw outdated brochures containing incorrect information.  
The question is whether, in all of the circumstances there has been conduct likely to mislead or deceive: 
Demagogue Pty Ltd v Ramensky (1992) 39 FCR 31.  
37 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s82 and s87. A requirement of reliance also curtails claims where the 
Plaintiff knew the representation was not true or had ceased to regard that representation as influential.  
However, the Australian Consumer and Competition Commission (ACCC) (being the body charged with 
enforcement of the TPA) may bring an action for breach of s52 without the need to show that anyone has been 
misled.    
38 See Hornsby Building Information Centre Pty Ltd v Sydney Building Information Centre Pty Ltd (1978) 140 
CLR 216, 228 where Stephen J relied on passing off actions by way of analogy. 
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Section 52 is designed to ensure that ‘trading must not only be honest but must not 
even, unintentionally, be unfair.’39  This gives the section a far wider ambit than most 
common law causes of action that generally require some degree of fault, intent, or 
failure to take reasonable care.  As such, it is an attractive cause of action for a litigant 
and a threatening one for defendants. There is no requirement equivalent to duty of care 
or privity of contract; rather, the notion is reliance on the conduct in question leading to 
loss.  The pool of potential plaintiffs – and defendants - is increased as a result. 
The power of s52 is not only due to the simplicity of the section itself, but also those 
facilitative sections elsewhere in the TPA that reinforce it. For instance, the remedies' 
section allows the recovery of damages for those who have sustained loss as a result of 
the conduct.40  As well as an award of damages, the TPA allows the court to make any 
orders it thinks fit including selecting from an extensive suite of remedies in order to 
compensate the plaintiff in whole or in part for the loss or damage, or to prevent or 
reduce the loss or damage.41
Other examples of facilitative sections include 
? S75B – which provides that those liable for the breach of s52 include not only 
the main perpetrator but also any party ‘involved’ in the contravention.42
? S84 - which sets out a statutory definition of agency that is broader than common 
law.43
? S51A  -which provides that the onus or proving that a prediction about the future 
was reasonably made lies on the maker of the statement.  
? S82 – a six year time limit for claiming loss or damage by conduct in 
contravention of the TPA.
The final contributor to the considerable scope of s52 is the attitude of Australian 
courts in interpreting it.  Courts have been strident in their development of s52 and the 
protection of the principles of fair trading that it exemplifies.  For instance (and 
particularly relevant in the context of liability for cruise ship passengers) the courts 
virtually ignore contractual clauses seeking to exclude or limit liability that may accrue 
under s52.  Such clauses are generally regarded as attempting to undo the effect of s52 
and will not be applied.44  Another example is that currently45 there seems to be no 
                                                          
39 Ibid. 
40 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s82. The section reads:  ‘(1) A person who suffers loss or damage by 
conduct of another person that was done in contravention of …[amongst others, s52]…may recover the 
amount of the loss or damage by action against that other person or against any person involved in the 
contravention.’ 
41 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s80 and s87.  Some remedies include an injunction (s80) declaration, 
rendering an agreement void, varying the contract, refusing to enforce the contract, requiring the refund of 
money or property, varying the contract or covenant in such a manner as the court considers just and equitable 
(s87).  
42 The section reads: 
“A reference in this part to a person involved in a contravention of a provision of [amongst others, s52] 
shall be read as a reference to a person who: 
 (a) has aided, abetted, counselled or procured the contravention; 
 (b) has induced, whether by threats or promises or otherwise, the contravention; 
(c) has been in any way, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to, the contravention; or 
 (d) has conspired with other to effect the contravention” 
However, the extraterritorial application of Act set out in s5 does not apply to s75B: see s5(1). 
43For instance, a person with apparent authority can give authority to another person: Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth), s84(2). 
44 For a maritime example of the ignoring of exclusion clauses once s52 has been held to apply, see Comalco v 
Mogal Freight Services (Oceania Trader) (1993) 113 ALR 677.  A disclaimer clause can only be effective if 
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concept akin to contributory negligence leading to a reduction of the measure of 
damages.  Once the violator’s conduct is found to breach s 52 then it will be liable for 
the whole of the loss (even if the complainant itself made decisions or omissions46 that 
led to the loss.) Finally, in deciding whether conduct was misleading, deceptive or 
likely to mislead or deceive, the test is not what a reasonable person would think.  
Courts will look at the class of people likely to be affected by the conduct – including 
the gullible, not so intelligent and poorly educated.47
All these features mean that section 52 is a formidable opponent of the complex 
principles of liability that have been developed for common law causes of action and 
particularly those that have been traditionally well protected from claims through the 
use of contractual terms limiting or excluding liability. The ability to cut across well-
established rules of privity, its relative immunity to exclusion and limitation clauses, 
and the six-year time limit for a claim for damages48 are particularly significant.   
Why might cruise passengers be interested in a s52 action?49
Where a cruise ship operator or its agent50 gives a prospective passenger the wrong 
impression about some aspect of the holiday, then this will most likely constitute 
misleading or deceptive conduct.51  Cases from the USA provide useful fact examples.52
For example, a brochure that represents cabins to be ‘special, luxurious and beautiful’ 
when the reality turns out to be anything but53 will constitute misleading or deceptive 
conduct under s52. Other examples might be a deceptive explanation of port or other 
charges,54 or the order of ports or length of time to be spent at each,55 or the 
                                                                                                                               
it has the effect of actually erasing that which is misleading in the conduct because it then modifies the 
conduct: Benlist Pty Ltd v Olivetti Australia Pty Ltd (1990) ATPR 41-043, as cited in Miller, at 1.52.75.   
45 As a result of Henville v Walker (2001] 206 CLR 459. This decision has the dubious distinction of being 
named by a leading Australian commentator, Professor Warren Pengilly in his article: ‘The Ten Most 
Disastrous Decisions made Relating to the Trade Practices Act’ (2002) 30 Australian Business Law Review
331. Nevertheless, it has been followed in several judgments already (see for example I & L Securities Pty Ltd 
v HTW Valuers (Brisbane) Pty Ltd (2002) 210 CLR 109.) The writer understands that the Australian 
Government (Department of Treasury) is considering proposing amendments to allow for contribution to the 
loss to be taken into account in the assessment of damages.   
46 Argy v Blunts and Lane Cove Real Estate Pty Ltd (1990) 26 FCR 112; 94 ALR 719, 744 –745. See also the 
recent case of Woolworths Ltd v APL Co Pte Ltd [2001] NSWSC 662. (Supreme Court of New South Wales) 
In the Woolworths case, representations were contained in a notice of impending arrival of goods given to 
customs but also provided to the importer.  The carrier mistakenly misdescribed the cargo as general purpose, 
not reefer (refrigerated) cargo.  The importer did have other means to check the description, but relied wholly 
on the carrier’s notice.  The importer collected the cargo from the stevedore and in reliance on the notice, 
failed to realise that the container required power.  As a result, the contents spoiled.  The court held that the 
importer knew this container was a reefer and required refrigeration (at [52]); not the least because it was a 
consignment the importer had shipped but then recalled.  The claim in tort was reduced by 30%, but the 
plaintiff recovered full damages under the alternative claim based on s52. 
47 Puxu Pty Ltd v Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd (1980) 31 ALR 73, 93 (Lockhart J.) However, the 
courts have adopted the notion of puffery, where representations could not be intended to be taken literally: 
see Stuart Alexander & Co (Interstate) Pty Ltd v Blenders Pty Ltd (1981) 53 FLR 307, 311 (Lockhart J.). 
48 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s82(2). 
49 At this stage we are assuming that the TPA applies to the conduct in question. 
50 ‘Agent’ is broadly defined for the purposes of the TPA – see s84. 
51 ACCC Travel and Tourism – and the TPA (ACCC Publishing Unit) Nov. 1999, 9. 
52 See site by Judge Thomas A Dickerson <http://www.classactionlitigation.com> at 29 June 2004. 
53 See Vallery v Bermuda Star Line 141 Misc 2d 395, 532 NYS 2d 965 (NY Sup 1988) as cited by Judge 
Thomas A Dickerson ‘The Cruise Passenger’s rights and remedies’ 
<http://www.classactionlitigation.com/library/cruiserights.htm> at 29 June 2004.  
54 Ibid, at text accompanying fn 138.  
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recommendation of the quality of shore based excursions operated by third parties but 
sanctioned and promoted by the cruise ship operator.  Representations that turn out to be 
misleading,56 and have been relied upon by a passenger who has sustained loss or 
damage as a result, will sound in damages. 57  Even conduct post performance can be 
caught by s52, such as in the course of negotiating a settlement of a claim by a 
passenger against a cruise ship operator.58
Using s52 to pursue a personal injury claim is, at present, possible59 but not 
common60.  An example of such a claim might be if a querulous elderly passenger was 
coaxed up a gangway after being told it was perfectly safe and had just been checked by 
engineers.  In fact there was no proof that any checks had taken place and during her 
embarkation the gangway gave way injuring her.   Another example would be a 
representation in a brochure assuring passengers that the vessel had every last safety 
feature and that all crew were trained in responding to calamities; when the reality 
revealed only rudimentary training and only basic safety features.  Indeed, had the TPA
been applicable, White Star Line could well have been held liable for personal injuries 
caused by a reliance on the representation that the “Titanic” was unsinkable. 
Of course, many of these types of claims could be brought equally well in 
negligence or breach of contract.61  However, framed in tort or contract they would be 
susceptible to properly incorporated exclusion clauses and contractual limits of liability, 
including monetary and time limits.   From a passenger’s point of view, the beauty of 
the s52 action is that such exclusion and limitation clauses are virtually ignored.  Only if 
a disclaimer can be said to have erased the misleading effect of the conduct will the 
exclusion clause be valid.62  If the passenger has relied on the misleading or deceptive 
conduct, and sustained a loss or injury, then the exclusion clause will rarely be effective 
to block recovery.  Neither will the fact that the passenger contributed to the accident or 
the injury alter the liability of the cruise operator, which would remain 100%.63 Overall, 
                                                                                                                               
55 By analogy to Dawson v World Travel Headquarters Pty Ltd [1980] FLR 455, where the change in a tour 
itinerary meant that there was the loss of a ‘day’ in Singapore when compared with the representations made 
in the tour itinerary.
56 Insofar as representations as to future matters are concerned, the representor will be deemed to have been 
misleading if the representor did not have reasonable grounds for making the representation : Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (Cth), s51A(1).  The representor is deemed not to have had reasonable grounds for making the 
representation as to the future matter unless it proves otherwise: Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s51A(2).   
57 As stipulated in s82, the section that gives a right to claim damages for loss or damage suffered by conduct 
of another person that was done in contravention of a provisions including s52. 
58 See Dillon v Baltic Shipping Company (Mikhail Lermontov)  (1989) 21 NSWLR 614 where the trial judge 
held that the conduct of the defendant in the settlement of the plaintiff’s claim had been misleading: see at 
page 650.The Court of Appeal doubted the finding by the trial judge that the defendant had engaged in 
misleading and deceptive conduct in the settlement of the claim but upheld the plaintiff’s claim on this ground 
based on the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW): see Baltic Shipping Company (Mikhail Lermontov) v Dillon
(1991) 22 NSWLR 1 per Gleeson CJ at 9, Kirby P at 22 and Mahoney JA at 51.  The Dillon case is discussed 
further in relation to s74 in the text accompanying fn 81.  
59 Loss or damage is defined to include injury, thus making it possible to sue for damages: Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth), s4K. 
60 Law of Negligence Review September 2002 paragraph 5.11 
61For instance, in Dillon v Baltic Shipping Company (Mikhail Lermontov) (1989) 21 NSWLR 614 the plaintiff 
recovered damages for breach of contract for disappointment and distress at the loss of the balance of her 
holiday, following the UK case of Jarvis v Swan Tours Ltd [1973] QB 233.  That aspect of the decision was 
upheld on appeal to the High Court (1993) 176 CLR 344.  
62 An example of this would be a disclaimer about the quality or skills of third party operators.  If such a 
disclaimer was contained on any brochure recommending a certain operator, and it was sufficiently obvious, 
then this may well be effective. 
63 Henville v Walker (2001) 206 CLR 459. 
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the cause of action under s52 is easier to establish than a common law cause of action.64
For these reasons, the TPA has traditionally been a potentially powerful weapon against 
cruise ship operators. 65
Proposed amendments to TPA affecting claims under s52 for personal injury or 
death. 
The ramparts of s52 are under attack, at least as regards claims for personal injury.  In 
the insurance and legal landscape that occurred post September 11 2001, the Federal 
Government commissioned the Review of the Law of Negligence (known as the Ipp 
Report).66 Relevantly, the terms of reference required the development of:  
amendments to the TPA to prevent individuals commencing actions in reliance on the 
TPA, including misleading and deceptive conduct, to recover compensation for personal 
injury and death.67
The panel was concerned that changes wrought to the law of negligence by its 
recommendations might be undermined if the TPA continued to provide a ‘back door 
route’ to claims for personal injury.68  Amongst other reforms,69 the Ipp Report 
recommended that the TPA be amended to prohibit the award of damages for injury or 
death as a result of a breach of s52 or the related provisions in Division 5 Part 1 TPA.70
The Bill giving effect to that recommendation, the Trade Practices Amendment 
(Personal Injuries and Death) Bill 2003 (the Bill) would extinguish personal injury 
claims based on s52.  However the Bill has reached an impasse because the Senate 
insisted on amendments unacceptable to the Government.71   
The ACCC is vehemently opposed to the excising of personal injury and death 
claims from s52 and related provisions of the TPA: 
                                                          
64 For the reasons discussed above, at text accompanying fns 35 to 47. 
65 Although the number of cases brought against cruise ship operators in Australia is relatively low, there have 
been only a handful of cases that have alleged a breach of s52, and at least one that could have but didn’t; 
namely Gill v Charter Travel Co Unreported, Qld Sup Ct (De Jersey J), 16 February 1996, Butterworths 
Unreported Judgements BC 9600812. Further discussion of this case is contained in the text accompanying fn 
92. 
66 Final report released 2 October 2002 and available at: http://revofneg.treasury.gov.au/content/review2.asp 
(visited 29 June 2004). 
67 Ibid, Terms of Reference no 4 at page x. 
68 Ibid, paragraph 5.12. 
69 The Report suggests a wide range of reforms over personal injury negligence law.  In particular, it has 
suggested that the Commonwealth and the States enact an Act giving effect to the recommendations, to apply 
to any claim for personal injury or death arising out of negligence whether framed in contract, tort or for 
breach of statute: Recommendation 2. The report recommends sweeping changes to, amongst other things, 
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, limitation of actions, the tests for foreseeability, standard of care 
causation and remoteness of damage, proportionate liability and damages payable, as well as specifically 
considering the liability of public authorities, recreational service providers and not for profit organisations.  
Some States have already enacted these reforms.  However the detail of these suggested changes is beyond the 
ambit of this paper. 
70 The recommendation was hardly surprising, given that the terms of reference directed the Review to find 
some mode of preventing such claims.  However this proposed prohibition on damages for personal injury 
claims brought under Division 5 Part 1 TPA does not apply to s74, which is found in Division 5 part 2.  The 
operation of s74 is also a focus of the Ipp Report in a different context.  See below at text accompanying fn 
98. 
71 Bill No. 72 of 2003. The Senate passed the Bill with amendments on 1 December 2003; the Bill returned to 
the House of Representatives on 2 December 2003 where the amendments were rejected and the Bill returned 
to the Senate in its original form; the Senate again insisted on its amendments on 11 December 2004. 
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There is a real risk that some of the far reaching changes to the law now being considered 
may be rushed through as quick fix re-active measures with inadequate attention being 
paid to their long term effects. …The Commission can conceive of no circumstances in 
which it is or should be acceptable for a supplier to mislead or deceive a consumer…72
If the Bill were to pass, cruise ship operators would then only face the prospect of 
s52 claims if the claim does not involve injury or death.  It seems ironic that damages 
under s52 will flow for a misleading representation about a brochure, a cabin, or 
facilities on a cruise or on shore activities, but will not apply if the misleading 
representation happens to have a more serious outcome - personal injury or death.  
Those same reservations are held by the ACCC.73  It is also ironic that whilst one hand 
of Australian government appears reluctant to sign off on any of the Athens 
Conventions, the other hand of government is, through domestic legislation, creating a 
regime for personal injury compensation that makes the Athens Convention look 
generous.74  Also, it cannot be lost on those in power that the Bill effectively undercuts 
the ‘consumer protection’ aspect of the TPA for those it was intended to protect, while 
the use of s52 in litigation by big business is flourishing. 
Whilst the complications created for the cruise ship industry by the Bill and other 
TPA reforms are discussed later,75 cruise ship operators would undoubtedly welcome it 
or any other significant change to the reach of s52.    On the other hand, consumer 
groups, academics and plaintiff lawyers have joined the ACCC in criticising the 
outcome.76  In any event, at this time, s52 is still important to cruise ship operators.  
Unless and until the Bill can be made attractive to the Senate by some further 
amendment, s52 can still support a personal injury claim.   Even if the Bill, or one like 
it, were to be passed, s52 will remain relevant to non-personal injury claims. 
Section 74 – statutory warranty that corporation will exercise due diligence in the 
provision of services 
The other main provision of the TPA that has the potential to cause angst to cruise ship 
operators is s74.  It is contained in Part 5, Division 2 of the TPA, amongst various 
statutory warranties concerning the provision of goods.  S74 states: 
(1) In every contract for the supply by a corporation in the course of a business of services 
to a consumer there is an implied warranty that the services will be rendered with due care 
and skill and that any materials supplied in connexion with those services will be 
reasonably fit for the purpose for which they are supplied.  
(2)…77
                                                          
72 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission ‘Second Submission to the Principles based Review of 
the Law of Negligence’ August 2002. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Discussion of the Ipp Report’s proposed general negligence reform is best left to dedicated papers, but the 
reforms in some Australian States involve thresholds on claimable damages (so that a small claim may be 
barred) and caps on awards for general damages.  See the summary 
<http://assistant.treasurer.gov.au/atr/content/publications/2002/20021115_2.asp> at 29 June 2004.  
75 See discussion accompanying fn 112. 
76 eg see ACCC press release 2 September 2002 “Consumers To Lose From Negligence Review Proposals: 
ACCC” <http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/88163/fromItemId/378014> at 29 June 2004; 
Australian Consumers’ Association press release 3 September 2002 “Proposed Reforms to Law of Negligence 
“Over the Top” says ACA”; Australian Plaintiff Lawyers Association press release 2 October 2002  “Coonan 
lacks compassion and understanding” <http://www.apla.com/links_med_sub/releases/021002.htm> at 29 June 
2004.  
77 The remainder of the section reads: 
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‘Services’ is defined in s4 as:  
…a contract for or in relation to…(ii) the provision of, or the use or enjoyment of 
facilities for, amusement, entertainment, recreation or instruction… 
The warranties in the TPA, including s74, differ from the other consumer protection 
provisions in the TPA because the remedies for breach are not to be found in the TPA.
Instead, the remedies are those at common law - primarily breach of contract.  The 
implied statutory warranties are designed to complement and expand pre-existing law.   
As such, the TPA is not providing a complete scheme, but rather imposes on the 
common law a statutory warranty.  
Section 68 ensures compliance with the statutory warranty.  It provides: 
(1) Any term of a contract (including a term that is not set out in the contract but is 
incorporated in the contract by another term of the contract) that purports to exclude, 
restrict or modify or has the effect of excluding, restricting or modifying:  
(a) the application of all or any of the provisions of this Division; 
(b) the exercise of a right conferred by such a provision; 
(c) any liability of the corporation for breach of a condition or warranty implied by 
such a provision; or 
(d) the application of section 75A; 
is void.78
It is possible to limit liability under s74 as set out in s68A, but this will not apply to 
leisure passengers.79  Indeed, it is important that, (where Australian law governs the 
passage contract), passage conditions do not claim a right to limit liability that does not 
exist. That in itself would constitute misleading or deceptive conduct as well as breach 
other specific provisions of the TPA.80
Does s74 apply to a cruise passenger contract for services? 
In the famous Australian case of Dillon v Baltic Shipping Company81 (Mikhail 
Lermontov) the trial judge held that s74 applied to impose a requirement to exercise due 
                                                                                                                               
(2)…  Where a corporation supplies services … to a consumer in the course of a business and the consumer, 
expressly or by implication, makes known to the corporation any particular purpose for which the services are 
required or the result that he or she desires the services to achieve, there is an implied warranty that the 
services supplied under the contract for the supply of the services and any materials supplied in connexion 
with those services will be reasonably fit for that purpose or are of such a nature and quality that they might 
reasonably be expected to achieve that result, except where the circumstances show that the consumer does 
not rely, or that it is unreasonable for him or her to rely, on the corporation's skill or judgment.  
(3)  A reference in this section to services does not include a reference to services that are, or are to be, 
provided, granted or conferred under:  
a contract for or in relation to the transportation or storage of goods for the purposes of a business, trade, 
profession or occupation carried on or engaged in by the person for whom the goods are transported or stored; 
or (b) a contract of insurance. 
78 The section allows limitation of liability in certain circumstances, but not when the services are of a kind 
ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or household use or consumption.  Clearly a contract for cruising 
would fall within that exception.  Therefore limitations of liability are not permitted.  An interesting argument 
would be whether a limitation on the time available to sue for loss under a passage contract would breach s68 
as having the effect of restricting the remedy in s74. 
79 Though it is arguable that it could apply to business travellers, for instance those attending an onboard 
conference.  However such travellers would probably be entitled to protection because they are services of a 
kind ‘ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or household use’ within the definition of ‘Consumers’ in 
s4B.
80 For example, s53g.  Provisions in part 5, apart from s52, can be the subject of prosecution by the ACCC.  
81 (1989) 21 NSWLR 614. 
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care and skill in the navigation of a vessel carrying the plaintiff’s personal luggage,82
although not to the carriage of the plaintiff herself.  At the time of the Mikhail
Lermontov sinking, s74 contained its own definition of services, which included only 
the transportation of goods, not passengers.  As a result, limitations in the carriage 
contract seeking to limit or exclude liability in respect of luggage lost or damaged in 
breach of s74 were inoperative, though they were operative as regards the claim for 
personal injury.   
The Court of Appeal seemed to doubt the Trial Judge’s finding that s74 applied to 
the baggage component of the contract.  The Court of Appeal took the view that the 
contract was properly characterised as one for the carriage of a person and obiter 
comments indicate that the court took a dim view of the Trial judge’s device of cleaving 
the contract into two, one falling inside and the other outside s74.83  The doubts of the 
Court of Appeal in the Dillon case have been assuaged by amendments to section 74 in 
1986.84  The definition of services applicable since 1986 includes:   
the provision of, or the use or enjoyment of facilities for, amusement, entertainment, 
recreation or instruction…85
On its face, it seems clear that this definition includes cruise ship contracts, and 
there is academic support for this conclusion.86  Therefore, if the sinking had occurred 
after that amendment, Mrs Dillon would have been able to recover under s74 for 
personal injury caused by the defendant’s admitted failure to exercise due care and skill 
in the navigation of the vessel.  
Importantly, the appellate courts in the Dillon case were not required to address 
directly the parameters or content of the duty imposed by s74 on a cruise ship operator – 
namely, to exercise due care and skill in navigating a vessel. Nor was that in issue 
before the High Court.87  Therefore, the first instance judgment of Justice Carruthers is 
the current authority for the existence of such a duty within s74.   The imposition of 
such a duty in Dillon, and the fact that s68 does not allow its exclusion or limitation, is 
of great significance, particularly when one considers that shipowners have traditionally 
been able to claim protection against the consequent costs of negligence in the 
navigation of a vessel.88 There is no doubt that the imposition of such a duty will be 
challenged the next time it arises.  If the imposition of s74 to navigational services is 
upheld, it means that all cruise contracts to which Australian law applies will contain an 
obligation to use due care and skill in navigation – and, (because the contracts are with 
consumers89) no exclusion or limitation clause can undercut or effect that.90
                                                          
82 Ibid at 641-642. 
83 Baltic Shipping Company v Dillon (Mikhail Lermontov) (1991) 22 NSWLR 1 (Court of Appeal); see Kirby 
P at 22, Mahoney J. concurring. 
84 The definition of services in s74 was removed and the general definition of services found in s4 then 
applied to s74.  
85 The amendment to s74 came into effect in June 1986.  The definition of services is now found in s4 as set 
out in the text following fn 77.   
86 Warren Pingelly, ‘The Law of Travel and Tourism’ (Blackstone Press 1990), 71, fn 22; Atherton & 
Atherton ‘Tourism, Travel and Hospitality Law’ LBC (1998), [12.12 –12.16].   
87 Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (Mikhail Lermontov) (1993) 176 CLR 344. 
88 Be it contractual, or more commonly due to the operation of an international convention such as those in 
operation over cargo claims, passenger claims or general liability claims.  For a further discussion of 
limitation conventions see text accompanying fn 123 onwards. 
89 So that s68A does not apply. 
90 Although in certain circumstances, the shipowner may be able to limit liability under an international 
convention – see text accompanying fn 146.   
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Subject to the caveat under the next heading, it is not only injuries sustained for 
navigational error that would be covered by the statutory warranty - any injury sustained 
as a result of the so called ‘hotel functions’ of a cruise ship, or as a result of organised 
off shore activities, would also be subject to this statutory warranty.  For instance, injury 
sustained in a beauty or hairdressing salon or whilst taking a shore tour will sound in 
liability if the cruise ship operator or its agents have failed to exercise due care and skill.  
As noted by Atherton,91 there seems to have been a lost opportunity to establish the 
application of s74 to the hotel functions of cruise ships.  In the case of Gill v Charter 
Travel Co92 a passenger injured himself jumping into a pool that had been half emptied 
during the course of the day.  The pool had not been covered with a net, as was usual 
when a pool was not available for swimming.  Much of the case concerned the 
application of limitation clauses and a monetary cap on liability imposed by the 
contract. Ultimately the plaintiff recovered but his damages were capped.  Had s74 been 
pleaded by the plaintiff and held to apply, the limitation of liability clauses relied upon 
by the cruise ship operator would have been in breach of s68, and the contractually 
imposed cap on the claim would have been of no effect.  
Recent amendments to reach of s74 - Trade Practices Amendment (Liability for 
Recreational Services) Act 2002 
Section 74 has also had its wings clipped by recent statutory intervention limiting the 
reach of s74.  The amendment, which became effective on 19 December 2002, arose out 
of the desire of Federal Parliament to ensure that ‘individuals who choose to participate 
in inherently risky activities’93 can be permitted to take responsibility for their own 
safety – to voluntarily assume the risk of injury.  By virtue of the Trade Practices 
Amendment (Liability for Recreational Services) Act 200294 (the Amending Act), a new 
s68B allows corporations to exclude restrict or modify its liability for death or injury as 
a result of a breach of the duty to exercise due care and skill imposed by s74.    
Some important points to note about the Amending Act: 
? This amendment does not of itself exclude liability – an effective exclusion 
clause or disclaimer must be properly incorporated in the contract.  After a long 
absence, once again the ticketing cases and law relating to incorporating terms 
and conditions will become relevant in consumer protection under the TPA.
? Personal injury is broadly defined, including mental injury, aggravation 
acceleration or recurrence of an injury or disease or any form of behaviour or 
circumstance that can result in harm or disadvantage to the individual or the 
community. 
? Recreation services is also broadly defined, being 
  services that consist of participation in a sporting activity or other similar leisure 
pursuit, or
 - any other activity that involves a significant degree of exertion or physical risk 
and is undertaken for the purposes of recreation, enjoyment or leisure (the ‘catch 
all’ provision). 
                                                          
91  Above, fn 86, [12.15] (within fn 56). 
92  Unreported, Qld Sup Ct (De Jersey J), 16 February 1996, Butterworths Unreported Judgements BC 
9600812. 
93 Explanatory Memorandum to the Trade Practices Amendment (Liability for Recreational Services) Bill 
2002 <http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/ems/0/2002/0/20020628tradeem.htm> [1.4] at 29 June 2004. 
94 No 146 of 2002, commenced 19 December 2002.   
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Whilst the Explanatory Memorandum claims the amendments are aimed at those 
who ‘choose to participate in inherently risky activities’,95 in reality the amending Act 
extends much further than that.96  A ‘sporting activity or similar leisure pursuit’ would 
seem to encompass many activities on board a cruise ship and it is unclear where the 
line would be drawn – aquatic games? Quoits?  Aerobics?  Darts?  Ballroom dancing? 
The provision is hardly limited to extreme or inherently risky sports.  One wonders 
whether a situation like that in the Gill v Charter Travel case mentioned above97 where 
injuries resulted from skylarking around a pool, would fall within the amendment.  As 
for the catch all provision, much will depend on the court’s interpretation of the phrases 
‘significant degree of exertion or physical risk’ and ‘for the purposes of recreation, 
enjoyment or leisure.’  There is at least an argument that an entire cruise could be seen 
as recreational services, but it seems unlikely that the courts would so broadly construe 
a section limiting consumers’ rights.  One thing is certain - there is much scope for 
litigation to establish the reach of the new s68B. 
This is an amendment that is of great relevance to the cruise ship operator.  In a 
nutshell, the courts may, if the facts are right, enforce a properly drafted clause 
excluding liability for injury arising out of the provision of recreational services.    
Proposed further amendments to s74  - Ipp Report recommendations 
The recent amendments to the ambit of s74 appear to be only the beginning.   Those 
amendments had been drafted before the Ipp Report and were criticised by it.  The Ipp 
Report suggests that the amendments are both too narrow (because they only apply if 
there is a contract, and the exclusion is incorporated in that contract98) and too broad 
(because the definition of recreational services extends even to low risk activities).99
The Ipp Report instead favours the introduction of a separate statute which would, 
amongst other things, give all recreational providers100 protection from claims for 
personal injury where that injury was caused by the materialisation of an obvious risk101
and to provide that there be no liability for a failure to warn about an obvious risk.102  In 
addition, the Ipp Report favoured amending the definition of ‘recreational services’ in 
the TPA so that it takes in only activities ‘undertaken for the purposes of recreation, 
enjoyment or leisure which involves a significant degree of physical risk.’103 (‘Ipp 
Recommendations’)
The narrowing of the definition of recreational services would help clarify the 
uncertainty and difficulties of the definition used in the amending Act discussed above.  
However a claim against a cruise ship operator for personal injuries under s74 would, in 
most cases, not fall within the requirement of ‘a significant degree of physical risk’.  
The protection proposed by the Ipp Recommendations would be of minimal relevance 
to cruise ship operators, compared to other types of recreational service providers.   In 
that sense, the current law (with the new s68B) better protects the cruise ship industry. 
                                                          
95 Above, fn 93. 
96 As recognised by the Ipp Report, criticising the definition as being ‘extremely and unacceptably wide in its 
terms and very difficult to understand’ (at [5.61]).  See text accompanying fn 99. 
97 Text accompanying fn 92. 
98 Fn  66, [5.51]. 
99 Ibid, [5.61].   
100 Regardless of whether the claim was framed in tort, contract or beach of statute.  The Ipp Report proposed 
that the Act implementing its reforms be termed the Civil Liability (Personal Injuries and Death) Act. 
101 Recommendation 11. 
102 Recommendation 14. 
103 Recommendation 12. 
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At the time of writing, no legislation has yet been placed before Parliament to amend 
the TPA in accordance with the Ipp Recommendations. 
Importantly, the other proposals in the Ipp Report aimed at reforming the general 
law of negligence will, if enacted, be relevant to any claim for personal injury or death 
brought under the TPA.  The reforms would apply to any personal injury claim 
regardless of whether it is brought in contract, tort or under statute.104  The reforms 
suggested are wide ranging.105  At the time of writing, no legislation has been 
introduced into the Federal Parliament to implement those reforms, although several 
States and Territories have passed legislation adopting some of the Ipp Report 
recommendations.106 However, these more general reforms fall outside the ambit of this 
paper. 
s74 is still relevant to other claims, both personal injury or other types of loss. 
It is important not to lose sight of the fact that the recent amendment and Ipp 
recommendations as regards recreational services apply only to personal injury claims 
that arise out of recreational services.107  There will, therefore, be some types of 
personal injury claims that do not fall within the new s68B108 and most claims would 
fall outside the narrower definition proposed by the Ipp Report.109  For instance, it will 
not catch a claim for injury associated with a lack of due care and skill in the navigation 
of the ship (such as was found in the Dillon case and is discussed above), the traditional 
‘slip and trip’ claims, food poisoning, negligence during beauty services, legionnaires 
disease and so on.110  There are also those types of claim that do not involve personal 
injury that will not be affected by the amendment – such as damage to or loss of 
luggage or other economic loss.   
It can be seen that s74 is by no means a spent force for passengers seeking to bring a 
claim against cruise ship operators.  Ironically, it will assume greater significance if the 
Ipp recommendations are eventually enacted. 111  The fact that s74 cannot currently be 
excluded for anything but recreational services causing injury or death means that it is 
still a significant source of potential liability for a cruise ship operator.  To ignore it 
would be perilous.   
                                                          
104 Recommendation 2. 
105 Suggesting changes to personal injury and death claims in such areas as limitation of actions, proportionate 
liability, contributory negligence, foreseeability, standard of care, causation and remoteness of damage, and 
caps on damages. As to the latter, see the discussion at fn 74. 
106 For example, Queensland (Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002), New South Wales (Civil Liability Act 
2002 and Civil Liability Amendment (Personal Responsibility) Bill 2002); Western Australia (Civil Liability 
Act 2002, Volunteers (Protection from Liability) Act  2002); South Australia (Statutes Amendment (Liability 
for Personal Injury) Act 2002, Volunteer Protection Act 2001), Victoria (Wrongs and other Acts (Public 
Liability Insurance Reform) Act 2002).  Until the Commonwealth legislate to implement the Ipp Report 
recommendations, there is a potential conflict between State and Commonwealth law, which would be likely 
to be decided by the operation of s109 of the Constitution. 
107 A cruise ship operator might ambitiously claim that an entire cruise is a ‘recreational service’ but this 
would be unlikely to find favour with the courts who are committed to a broad interpretation of the TPA. 
108 Unless, as seems unlikely, the courts rule that an entire cruise is a contract for recreational services within 
s68B.  
109 Recommendation 12. 
110 Although those claims would be caught by the more general amendments proposed by the Ipp Report– see 
above, fn 105. 
111 Because the field of application of the amendment would be reduced if the Ipp Report definition of 
recreational services were to be adopted. 
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Conclusion – s52 and s74 
The ruction caused by the so called public liability crisis and the push to reform the 
laws of negligence has had a profound effect on the TPA and the liabilities of service 
providers such as cruise ship operators. From a principled perspective and using the 
cruise ship industry as an example of the provisions in operation, the amendments have 
created a hotch-potch of liabilities and exclusions.  The TPA has always scorned 
exclusion clauses where the aim is to cut down liability under the TPA, but in the 
context of s74, now they rise, phoenix-like, to assume significance.  Depending on the 
circumstances, in some cases contractual exclusions for personal injury claims will be 
effective. But in other cases they will be struck down, and mere reliance on those 
exclusions could of itself constitute misleading or deceptive conduct.112  The amending 
Act and the Bill do not even show a consistent approach to personal injury claims:  if 
the Bill had been passed, such claims would be as good as excluded from s52, but a s74 
claim for personal injuries can only be avoided where the injury has resulted from 
recreational services for which there has been an effective disclaimer of liability.113  The 
recreational service provider amendments proposed by the Ipp Report will make the law 
simpler, but will have less relevance to a cruise ship operator.  The approach to personal 
injury claims is made all the more poignant by the continued relevance of TPA in claims 
that would be classed as less significant, such as misleading representations about cabin 
size and luxury.   
Whilst there may be overall a lessening of the cruise ship operator’s liability for 
personal injury, there is a significant increase in complexity for those attempting to both 
‘manage’ their affairs in keeping with the TPA and assess their legal liabilities under it.  
From the passenger’s perspective, the resultant matrix of what is claimable and what is 
not could be described as perplexing and unprincipled. 
Other provisions of TPA that can be relevant to a cruise ship operator  
This paper has confined itself to an examination of s52 and s74 of the TPA.  However 
there are several other sections of the TPA that can be relevant to cruise ship operators.  
Closely aligned with s52 is s53, which deals with specific types of misleading 
representations; such as those concerning value, price or quality of goods114 or 
services115 or a false or misleading representation concerning the existence, exclusion or 
effect of any condition, warranty, guarantee, right or remedy.116  Breach of provisions of 
the TPA (other than s52117) is an offence and the court can impose penalties.118  A cruise 
ship operator must also be careful not to accept payment for cruises at a time when it 
knows it will not be conducting that particular cruise or will be providing a materially 
                                                          
112 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s53(g). The breach of this section can be the subject of a penalty. 
113 This may be due to the fact that s74 does not find its remedy in the TPA but rather in common law 
damages; so a restriction of the type of claim that can be brought for breach of contract may have been 
regarded as problematic.  Also, a breach of implied warranties about the supply of goods and services often do 
result in personal injury or death, and perhaps this was felt to be too central to the rights of consumers to do 
away with in its entirety.  S52, with its remedies being an entirely statutory creation, is a different matter. 
114 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s53(a). 
115 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s53(aa). 
116 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s53(g).  Arguably claiming a right to limit liability for breach to 
performing the service again, claiming as it does a right to rely on s68A (which will not apply to the vast 
majority of cruise passenger contracts because they are consumers not business users) would be a breach of 
this provision and possibly misleading and deceptive in its own right. 
117 And some other provisions not the subject of this paper. 
118 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s79. 
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different cruise,119 or overbooking a cruise because such conduct will offend s58.  In 
addition the TPA imposes statutory warranties about the quality of goods supplied under 
a contract, which would arguably apply to the quality of meals and beverages, and may 
apply to equipment supplied or hired to passengers.120
Finally the significance of the unconscionability provisions in Part 4A has been 
bolstered of late by the introduction of damages as a remedy.  The unconscionability 
provisions in s51AB are of significance to all those in any industry, introducing ‘a 
general duty to trade fairly.’121 As Baltic v Dillon showed,122 the conduct of a cruise 
ship operator and its advisers as regards settlement of a claim may come under scrutiny 
for fairness. 
How does the TPA interrelate with a cruise-ship operator’s right to limit liability 
under International Conventions? 
As is explained above, the courts fiercely defend consumers’ rights to the protection 
offered by the TPA, to the point that exclusion clauses and disclaimers are rarely 
effective in excluding TPA liability.  However, there is a long tradition, enshrined in 
international conventions, of shipowners limiting their liability generally, and in relation 
to passengers in particular.123  There are two categories of limitation regimes that are 
relevant to cruise ship passengers.   
First, there are general limitation regimes that seek to limit shipowners’ liability in 
various types of claims, including passenger claims.  There are two general limitation 
conventions in operation internationally, being the 1957 Convention124 and the 1976 
Convention.125  The latter has been in force in Australia since 1991 and is about to be 
updated by the 1996 Protocol.126  Secondly, there are the limitation regimes specifically 
directed at passengers – namely, the Athens Convention and its various amending 
protocols.127 Both the general conventions and the Athens Convention seek to limit the 
ultimate liability to passengers, but the mode of doing so is different.   The 1976 
Convention sets a global limit on all passenger claims arising on one distinct occasion, 
                                                          
119 It would be materially different if a particular port of call were to be left out, or the time there was to be 
appreciably reduced, or if the total time of the cruise was altered.  See Dawson v World Travel Headquarters 
Pty Ltd (1981) 53 FLR 455. 
120 The warranty requiring equipment to be fit for its purpose could fall under s74(2) (as an adjunct to 
services) or under s70 and s71 which deal with a contract for the supply of goods. 
121 Miller, [1.51AB.5]. 
122 Above at text accompanying fn 58. 
123This paper does not explore the restrictions or practical operations of the Limitation of Liability for 
Maritime Claims Act 1989 (Cth).  For that, see Ch 10 of White (ed.), Australian Maritime Law (2nd ed, 2000) 
(White), and Davies and Dickey (ed.), Shipping Law (2nd ed, 1995) Ch 15 (Davies & Dickey). 
124 International Convention Relating to the Limitation of Liability of Owners of Sea Going Ships, Brussels 
1957.
125 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims done at London 1976. (1976 Convention). 
126 Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims Act 1989 (Cth) (LLMC Act).  In 2001 the LLMC Act was 
amended by the International Maritime Conventions Legislation Amendment Act 2001 to incorporate the 1996 
Protocol.  The protocol will come into effect internationally on 13 May 2004 and the LLMC Act amendment 
incorporating the 1996 protocol into Australian Law will come into effect on the same day. –Commonwealth
Gazette(Special) 2004, No. S157 dated 13 May 2004.  
127 Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, 1974 (Athens 
Convention).  The 1976 Protocol to the Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their 
Luggage by Sea, done in London 1976 (1976 Protocol) introduced the Special Drawing Right (SDR) as the 
monetary unit, and increased the applicable limits.  The 1990 Protocol never came into force as it failed to 
receive sufficient ratifications. The 2002 Protocol to the Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of 
Passengers and their Luggage by Sea 1974 (2002 Protocol) has 6 of the required 10 signatories as at 30 April 
2004 (Article 20).   
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calculated by multiplying a specific amount by the number of passengers the ship is 
permitted to carry.128  The Athens Convention, on the other hand, sets a limit for the 
claim of each passenger.129   Cruise ship operators find the Athens Convention scheme 
more attractive (which is understandable, as it is specifically geared to passenger 
claims).  Where there are only a few claimants, the Athens Convention limit will apply 
to each of their claims.  Contrast that with the 1976 Convention in the same scenario, 
which calculates a global limit for the sum total of all claims.  That limit will ordinarily 
be so large that, in reality, there is no cap on those claims at all.130 As we shall see,131 it 
is only in a very serious accident that the limit under the 1976 Convention would come 
into play. 
The existence of these limitation regimes, when taken with the attitude of the courts 
to exclusion or limitation of liability under the TPA, poses some interesting questions 
for injury and death claims.132  This paper concentrates on whether a cruise ship 
operator can claim limitation under these conventions for a single catastrophic event 
caused by failure to provide navigational services with due care and skill in breach of 
s74– akin to the Baltic Shipping Company v Dillon fact scenario, but with a less happy 
outcome in terms of casualties.133  This scenario has been selected because of all the 
passenger claims a cruise ship operator may have to face, this is the type where 
limitation would be critical. 
Athens Convention and its protocols 
The Athens Convention specifically covers liability to passengers on ships.  However, 
neither the original convention nor any of its subsequent protocols have been adopted 
by Australia nor incorporated in domestic law.  Australia is still considering its attitude 
towards the Athens Convention and the 2002 Protocol.134 Therefore, at present, the 
Athens Convention will not apply to a cruise ship by force of Australian law.135
As explained above, a cruise ship operator would prefer to have a ‘per passenger’ 
limit of liability, as offered by the Athens Convention, rather than a global limit for all 
passenger claims.  A cruise ship operator often seeks to incorporate the provisions of the 
Athens Convention (in one of its forms) into its carriage contract.  Whilst that may affect 
a claim for breach of contract or tort claims,136 its effectiveness for TPA claims is 
somewhat less certain.  There would be a conflict between the intention of the TPA and 
the terms of a contractual limitation.  One would expect that the Courts would continue 
to express their strident view of the intended operation of the TPA and refuse to allow a 
                                                          
128 Article 7. 
129 Article 7. 
130 See further discussion of this limitation amounts commencing at text accompanying fn 146 below. 
131 See text accompanying fn 153 below.  Once the 1990 Protocol enters into force, the limit will be even 
higher – see text accompanying fn 157.  
132 As an aside, a breach of s52 for matters such as cabin size or number of days/stopovers would not fall 
within the terms of the Athens Convention, which applies only to personal injury and damage to or loss of 
luggage or valuables (Art 14).  The LLMC Act, however, is more broadly worded (see article 2, particularly 
2(c)).  In any event, a claim by a passenger for damage other than injury or death would be unlikely to reach a 
sufficient quantum to challenge the limitation amounts. 
133 The same reasoning would apply to luggage claims resulting from the same scenario. 
134 Email from Beta Zadnik, Australian Federal Department of Transport and Regional Services Friday 14 
November 2003. 
135 Although a cruise ship operator may be in a position to assert that it applies by force of law in another 
country: see fn139 below. 
136 And for instance it could affect the limit of a claim that falls within the Recreational Services amendment 
discussed in text accompanying fn 94 above. 
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cruise ship operator to rely on a contractual term137 to limit liability for loss or damage 
caused by a breach of the TPA.
In a sense, the very situation in which the cruise ship operator would like to have 
limited its liability, a loss of a vessel with many passengers seriously injured or killed, 
may not be able to be subject to a contractually incorporated limitation.  A s74 claim for 
lack of due care and skill in the provision of navigational services causing injury can be 
brought, and would be protected by s68 from any contractual attempt at excluding or 
limiting liability.  The recent amendments limiting the reach of s74 are relevant only to 
recreational services, but that would not affect a claim for a breach of the obligation to 
exercise due care and skill as regards navigational services.138  Therefore such a claim – 
or more likely, series of claims – for a breach of s74 for the failure to navigate with due 
care and skill would be unlikely to be limited by contractual incorporation of the Athens 
Convention.139
Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims Act 1989 (Cth) (LLMC Act) 
Although the Athens Convention has never been part of the law of Australia, there is 
still the shipowner’s more general right to limit offered by the LLMC Act.  In this case, 
Australia has ratified the 1976 Convention and enacted it into domestic law.   In this 
context, there is a potential clash between the TPA and LLMC Act, the latter enacting an 
international convention to which Australia is a party.  Both have the force of law in 
Australia.140
As a matter of interpretation, one expects Australia to seek to comply with its 
international commitments - in this case, providing a limitation of liability scheme to 
shipowners who may find themselves before Australian courts.  As such, the LLMC Act
would have precedence over the TPA.  This is also a conclusion supported by the 
surrounding circumstances.  The LLMC Act has been amended as recently as 2001141
and no effort has been made to exclude TPA claims from its operation.142  Also, the 
1996 Protocol specifically allowed state parties to impose a higher limit than that in 
Article 7.  Australia has not done so, in relation to TPA claims or any other types of 
claims. 
The fact scenario being considered, though a breach of s74, would clearly fall within 
the operation of the LLMC Act.143  In this writer’s view, the LLMC Act would take 
precedence over the TPA.  Therefore, whilst the liability to the passengers would still 
                                                          
137 As opposed to a legal right to limit liability, as would be the case if Australia had ratified the Athens 
Convention.
138 See text accompanying fn 97 above. 
139 If the ship is flying the flag of or is registered in a State Party to the Athens Convention then a cruise ship 
operator could assert that the Convention applies as a matter of law under Article 2.  There seems to be no 
case law within Australia that has arisen on this point.  In a similar but distinguishable situation, courts in the 
United States of America have been known to enforce the limitation applicable in the foreign country where 
their citizens have been injured on a foreign cruise: see Berman v Royal Cruise Line 1995 AMC 1926 (Cal 
sup. Ct 1995), Kirman v Compagnie Francais de Croisieres 1994 AMC 2848 (Cap Sup Ct 1993) and other 
cases cited in Kaye, Rose and Maltzman LLP, Batten the Hatches; the IMO sets a stormy course with a new 
Athens Convention (2003) <http://www.kayerose.com/Articles/articles46.html> at 14 April 2004. But the 
situation discussed here is distinguishable because it involves a contract to which Australian law applies (or 
else s74 would be irrelevant).  
140 See Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims Act 1989 (Cth), s6. 
141 To adopt the 1996 Protocol: see fns 126 and 155. 
142 Indeed, had the proposed Bill become law, then the issue would have evaporated in relation to personal 
injury and death claims based on s52. 
143 Article 2.1(a), Article 7. 
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exist and could not be excluded,144 it would still be subject to limitation in accordance 
with the LLMC Act.145
Some comments about the limitation amount under the LLMC Act, and forum 
shopping issues. 
Having concluded that the LLMC Act would provide cruise ship operators with the right 
to limit in the fact scenario in question, let us explore how the actual limitation amount 
would work under the 1976 Convention.146 The limitation applicable to passengers is 
contained in Article 7, which provides that the liability for all passenger claims arising 
on any distinct occasion shall be limited to an amount arrived at by multiplying the 
number of passengers the ship is authorised to carry by 46,666 Special Drawing Rights 
(SDR).147   The Article goes on to provide a cap on passenger claims of 25 million SDR, 
which is equivalent to the limitation amount multiplied by about 535 passengers (the 
cap).148  It would seem149 that each passenger’s claim is not limited to the 46,666 figure, 
but rather that the total pool of funds available is determined by the calculation set out 
in Article 7.150  Therefore the limitation amount would only be relevant if the 
aggregated damages awards were in excess of the total pool of funds.  If only a few 
passengers are injured then they may recover amounts in excess of the 46,666 figure 
each, so long as the combined total does not exceed the total pool of funds.  If there are 
many injured passengers, and the total of all the claims exceeds the total pool of funds, 
then the individual payouts will be diminished accordingly.  
The larger cruise vessels are in a sense, better protected than the small ones by the 
provisions of the unamended 1976 Convention because of the cap.151 Smaller cruise 
operators would be unlikely to get close to the cap, and are therefore carrying more 
potential liability per passenger than a larger ship.  A cruise ship with 3000 passengers 
on board would, under the 1976 Convention, have an upper cap on claims152 of about 
AUD$49 million.153  Without that cap, the calculated limit would be more like 
AUD$277 million. 
                                                          
144 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s68. 
145 An interesting question will arise if the Ipp Report reforms regarding negligence are fully accepted and 
enacted by Federal Parliament, as those reforms contain caps on personal injury claims.  Would the Ipp 
reforms or the LLMC provide the relevant cap on damages payable?  It is certainly arguable that the LLMC 
Act, being specific to maritime passengers, will override a more general statute implementing the Ipp reforms.  
In addition, the LLMC Act has a certain stature by reason of being the implementation of an international 
convention to which Australia is a party.  These same arguments would be available to a passenger should a 
carrier seek to rely on State based implementation of the Ipp Report reforms.  The writer has been informed 
by DOTARS that it is currently considering its submission to the Ipp Review about whether the convention 
caps ought to take precedence, or the Ipp reform caps. 
146  We will, for the moment, assume an event that occurs before the 1996 Protocol came into force. 
147 As at 29 April 2004 the SDR Rate was AUD$1.98.  It does fluctuate in keeping with the value of the 
various international currencies involved. 
148 See White, fn 123, 321. 
149 Ibid.  
150 Any attempt by a cruise ship operator to contractually impose an individual per passenger limit on a 
personal injury claim made under s52 or s74 of the TPA would probably fail, and in the case of s74, most 
certainly fall foul of s68 unless the recreational services provisions apply.  It may even breach s53 (g) as being 
a false or misleading representation concerning the exclusion or effect of any condition, warranty, right or 
remedy: see text accompanying fn 116 above.   
151 Being 25 million units of account - See Article 7(1). 
152 Assuming no right to break limitation under Article 4. 
153 Based on an SDR rate of AUD$1.98, as it was on 29 April 2004.  Current rates can be found at the IMF 
website: http://www.imf.org/external/np/tre/sdr/db/rms_five.cfm (visited 29 June 2004). 
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As already noted, the 1996 Protocol came into force internationally on 13 May 2004 
after receiving its 10th signatory early in 2004.154  The 1996 Protocol has been enacted 
as a schedule to the LLMC Act, and became part of Australian law on 13 May 2004 
also.155  There are a number of significant changes for cruise ship operators.  For a start, 
the limitation figure for passenger claims has almost quadrupled.156  But the more 
challenging aspect is that the amount for passenger claims will no longer be capped.  
That means a passenger ship carrying 3000 passengers will have a total limit of 
approximately AUD $1.039 billion.157  The reality is that the limits of liability per 
passenger are now so high that all but the worst accidents involving large cruise vessels 
would fall under the limitation amount.158
With the 1996 Protocol coming into effect, we will see at least 3 general 
international limitation regimes in operation simultaneously: the 1957 Convention, the 
1976 Convention in its original form and then the 1976 Convention as updated by the 
1996 Protocol.  There is no requirement of a connection between forum and dispute as a 
precondition for claiming limitation.159  This must beg the question - can a cruise ship 
operator reduce the limitation amount applicable by choosing to set up the limitation 
fund in a jurisdiction with a friendlier limitation scheme than that of Australia?  Having 
opened this can of worms, this paper limits itself to a few comments.160  The fact that a 
limitation fund can theoretically be constituted anywhere seems to suggest that the 
cruise ship operator has that very option.161  Under the 1976 Convention, there is no 
provision concerning multiple proceedings162 although it does give some protection to 
shipowners who constitute funds in a place with some connection to the claim but 
whose ship or property has been arrested elsewhere.163  It seems that a cruise ship 
operator could gain a distinct advantage, if only tactical, by carefully and quickly 
choosing a location for the limitation fund to be constituted. An increased advantage can 
be obtained by choosing from the various places with some connection to the claim.164
This will be particularly the case with the 1996 Protocol in force, as there will be 
relatively few jurisdictions that have ratified it. 
                                                          
154 International Maritime Organisation summary of status of conventions 
<http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=247> at 29 June 2004. 
155 The 1996 Protocol has been enacted as an amendment to the LLMC Act by International Maritime 
Conventions Legislation Amendment Act 2001. The commencement date of the Act was proclaimed as 13 
May 2004 (Commonwealth Gazette 2004, No. S157 dated 13 May 2004). 
156 Increased from 46,666 to 175,000 units multiplied by number of passengers the ship is authorised to carry. 
157 175,000 units of account per passenger.  That sum is calculated on a passenger carrying capacity of 3000, 
using an SDR conversion rate of 1 SDR = AUD$1.98 (as at 29 April 2004), see fn 153.   
158 the other significant reform set out in the 1996 Protocol is the ‘default mechanism of the tacit acceptance 
procedure’ see National Interest Analysis  Protocol, done at London on 2 May 1996, to amend the Convention 
on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, of 19 November 1976 [2001] ATNIA 15 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/other/dfat/nia/2001/15.html> at 1 September 2003. 
159 DC Jackson ‘Enforcement of Maritime Claims’ (3rd ed.) LLP 2000, 586. 
160 For a lengthy discussion of the issues see Jackson, ibid, and the references to Davies & Dickey, and White 
(ed) above at fn 123. 
161 Though it is subject to stay of proceedings if a passenger contests that another court is in the correct forum. 
162 Namely where the passengers sue in one jurisdiction and the cruise ship operator constitutes a fund in 
another. 
163 Article 13.  A ship or other property that has been arrested within a state party shall always be released if a 
fund has been constituted at a port where the occurrence took place or the next port of call, if it occurred 
whilst at sea; at the port of disembarkation, or in the state where the arrest was made.  The Article stops short 
of ruling that a fund constituted in a manner that falls within Art 13 should be regarded as the proper forum of 
the limitation fund and able to resist attempts to have that limitation proceeding stayed. 
164 Ibid. 
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 So it would seem that forum shopping would have to be a risk worth taking - 
indeed, worth fighting for - for cruise ship operators, with at least several different 
jurisdictions suitable for setting up a limitation fund and defending the choice of forum.  
For instance, imagine if a Baltic Shipping v Dillon situation were to occur again, with a 
cruise ship on route from Australia to New Zealand when it founders and sinks, with 
many passengers injured.   There are passengers from both countries on board.  NZ has, 
so far, not adopted the 1996 Protocol, and so has a friendlier limitation fund for cruise 
ship operators.165  Undoubtedly the shipowner would be advised to seek to constitute a 
limitation fund in New Zealand and thereafter defend its choice in the courts. 
In any event, the discussion is a worst case scenario for large cruise ships.  In reality, 
it is hard to imagine total damages claims approaching the LLMC Act limitation amount 
for a large cruise liner unless there are multiple passengers severely injured in one 
catastrophic event.  The limitation amount is likely to be of more assistance to those 
carrying only a handful of passengers, particularly where one or more of the passengers 
are badly injured.  
Conclusion 
Over the past 10-15 years the strength of the TPA has increased and it has become a 
very real threat to cruise ship operators.  The application of s74 has broadened and 
arguably includes a cruise ship carriage contract.  The significance of s52 continues to 
grow as the courts continue to interpret it expansively. 
But the pendulum has swung, at least a little.  The recent and proposed changes to 
the TPA would measurably alter the cruise ship operator’s potential liability to 
passengers where personal injury or death has been the outcome.  In certain 
circumstances where the plaintiff suffered personal injury, a well drafted and properly 
incorporated contractual exclusion of liability will have a degree of force long 
considered banished from the legal landscape in Australia, certainly in so far as 
consumer claims under the TPA were concerned.   This is the case where the claim fits 
within the amendment to s74 allowing the operator to exclude liability for personal 
injury claims during recreational activities.   
This will represents a pegging back of the passenger’s potential causes of action 
against a cruise ship operator.  However there is a real state of flux at present because 
the ultimate package of legislative reforms is unknown.     
In any event, the TPA will remain a potent force for those aspects left untouched by 
the recent amendments.  For instance, even if personal injury claims are excluded from 
s52, the TPA will still respond to misleading or deceptive representations that result in 
other forms of damage, or personal injury caused by a failure to exercise due care and 
skill NOT involving recreational services.  One claim very much still currently within 
the ambit of the TPA would be for personal injuries arising out of the cruise ship 
operator failing to exercise due diligence in providing navigational services. The 
significance of this is heightened by the fact that in certain circumstances the TPA will 
apply to events that take place outside Australia.  However such a claim will, in this 
writer’s opinion, be subject to the shipowner’s right to limit under the LLMC Act.
The cruise ship operator will find that the burden will be attempting to accommodate 
these varying scenarios in its terms and conditions, and its claims management, without 
offending different provisions of the TPA - those that warn against excluding liability 
                                                          
165 As at 29 April 2004, New Zealand had not adopted the 1996 Protocol.
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for actions not able to be excluded pursuant to s68A, or making misleading 
representations about the effect of a contractual term.166
It is difficult to imagine an industry so uniquely vulnerable to s52 and s74 as the 
cruise ship industry.  This is because of the complete responsibility of the cruise ship 
operator for the cruise ship experience and the profile of all passengers as consumers.  A 
cruise ship operator gains little protection against claims falling within the TPA by 
relying on contractual terms limiting liability. The extraterritorial reach of the TPA and 
the fact it extends to advertising for business in Australia means that even cruise ship 
operators with no presence in Australia offering cruises entirely outside Australia, may 
be bound by the Act.  As such, cruise ship operators, certainly within and even outside 
Australia, would be well advised to ensure all their dealings with and for passengers, 
before, during and after cruises, are in compliance with the TPA.
                                                          
166 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s53(g). 
